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INSURING EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
ASAF LUBIN *
ABSTRACT
The study of the interaction between law and technology is more
critical today than ever before. Advancements in artificial intelligence,
information communications, biological and chemical engineering, and
space-faring technologies, to name but a few examples, are forcing us to
reexamine our traditional understanding of basic concepts in torts and
insurance law.
Yet, few insurance professionals and scholars will identify
themselves as working in the field of “law-and-technology.” For many of
them, technology is “just a fact about the world like any other,” as Ryan
Calo once put it, not one that always merits “special care.”1
This short paper is an attempt to build a first-of-its-kind bridge
between these two scholarly silos. Directed at an insurance audience, the
paper attempts to draw attention to a body of law-and-technology
scholarship that has so far gone mostly unnoticed by insurance
professionals.
The paper is built on the premise that insurance lawyers, whose
business model depends on the mitigation of losses from technological harm,
are not dramatically dissimilar from their law-and-technology counterparts.
Both are fascinated by the same set of questions: if, when, and how, might
Dr. Asaf Lubin is an Associate Professor of Law at Indiana University Maurer
School of Law, a Faculty Associate at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and
Society at Harvard University, a Visiting Fellow at the Information Society Project
of Yale Law School, a Visiting Scholar at the Federmann Cybersecurity Center at
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a Fellow at the Center for Applied Cybersecurity
Research at Indiana University, and a Visiting Fellow at the Nebraska Governance
and Technology Center at the University of Nebraska. I wish to thank Dan Schwarcz,
Gus Hurwitz, Demet Batur, Matthew Schaefer, Tammi Etheridge, and João
Marinotti for terrific feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. I further wish to thank
all the participants of the “Cyber Cyber Insurance Law Conference” organized
jointly by University of Connecticut Insurance Law Center and the University of
Minnesota Law School, as well as participants in the Nebraska Governance and
Technology Center Fellows’ Workshop and the Henry Jackson Society Cyber
Insurance event. Finally, I wish to thank the editors of the Connecticut Insurance
Law Journal for their consideration of this piece.
1
Ryan Calo, Commuting to Mars: A Response to Professors Abraham and
Rabin, 105 VA. L. REV. 84, 88 (2019).
*
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private and public regulation mitigate losses resulting from technological
risk. The paper draws key concepts from the law-and-technology literature
to explore the effectiveness and utility of regulation in mitigating risks from
emerging, evolving, and disruptive technologies. The paper further identifies
the different phases in technology’s life cycle and discusses the challenges
that each of these phases introduces on the insurance market.
Relying on cyber insurance as its primary case study, the paper
concludes by applying these insights to an assessment of a recent state-wide
regulation, the New York Cyber Insurance Risk Framework, the first of its
kind in the country. The paper demonstrates the promise and pitfalls of this
type of regulation, taking into account broader trends in the cyber insurance
market.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 12, 2021, the University of Minnesota and the University
of Connecticut Insurance Law Center co-organized A Cyber Cyber
Insurance Conference to examine the current state of our evolving cyber
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insurance markets. 2 The organizers wisely devoted one of the panels to the
unique position of government in fostering these markets. 3 As the event’s
website further noted, panelists were called to “explore what state and federal
governments can, and should, do to promote more robust cyber insurance
markets.” 4
As I was contemplating my written contribution for this symposium,
I was struck by just how much has been written over the years on this very
topic. Academics, international organizations, and cyber insurance
specialists have produced mountains of lengthy and persuasive accounts of
possible areas for regulatory reform. 5 Jay Kesan and Carol Hayes, for
For more information about the conference, see The Role of Law and
Government in Cyber Insurance Markets: A Cyber Cyber Insurance Conference,
UNIV. OF CONN. SCH. OF L.: INS. L. CTR., https://events.uconn.edu/event/78763/
2021-03-12 (last visited Jan. 31, 2022).
3
Id.
4
The Role of Law and Government in Cyber Insurance Markets: A Cyber Cyber
Insurance Conference, EVENTBRITE, https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-role-of-lawand-government-in-cyber-insurance-markets-registration-133229401727
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2022) (reservation website).
5
See, e.g., OECD, ENHANCING THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN CYBER RISK
MANAGEMENT 135–37 (2017) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (“Governments could
contribute to the availability of data on past cyber incidents, forward-looking
analyses on the changing nature of the risk and on the effectiveness of security
practices, including through the development or promotion of cyber security
standards. Governments should also closely monitor the market developments and
consider if there is a need to intervene to encourage greater clarity on coverage or to
support the management of accumulation risk.”); EUR. INS. & OCCUPATIONAL
PENSIONS AUTH., UNDERSTANDING CYBER INSURANCE – A STRUCTURED DIALOGUE
WITH INSURANCE COMPANIES 25 (2018) (exploring the following potential
contributions of regulations: (1) regulation of appropriate pricing and monitoring of
the risks, including potential aggregation risks; (2) promotion of incident reporting
and exchange of information; (3) enhancing a better understanding of risks; (4)
introduction of minimum IT and Information security standards; (5) increase the
level of awareness and prudence of new entrants (both insurers and buyers); (6)
ensure adequate capital requirements against underwriting risks; (7) prevention of
contagion in case of bigger scale); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Cyberensuring Security, 49
CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1499–500 (2017) (proposing “a strict-liability rule for harms
deriving from cyber-incidents” noting further that “this rule would impose
administratively defined statutory damages, but firms that have cyber insurance
policies covering third-party harms would only pay the lesser of those statutory
damages or actual provable damages for insured claims.”); Minhquang N. Trang,
Note, Compulsory Corporate Cyber-Liability Insurance: Outsourcing Data Privacy
2

2021

INSURING EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY

133

example, have discussed the prospect of “government subsidies for both
insurance and security technology.”6 Michael Faure and Bernold
Nieuwesteeg highlighted the role that government regulation of
cybersecurity practices could play in setting normative cues for cyber
insurance, particularly in the context of cyber risk pools. 7 Jan Lemnitzer
called on governments to: develop minimum cybersecurity standards for
small-to-medium businesses (“SMEs”), set up a claims database to increase
data sharing, and announce the intention to make cyber insurance
compulsory for SMEs in the near future. 8 Kenneth Abraham and Daniel
Schwarcz have explored the prospect of a federal reinsurance program for
cyber catastrophes. 9 Daniel Woods and Andrew Simpson have gone even
further by mapping out no less than twenty-three different possible
government interventions, breaking them down into six general themes,
which were then introduced as part of an overarching framework and
research roadmap for future scholarship. 10

Regulation to Prevent and Mitigate Data Breaches, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 389
(2017) (calling for a mandatory cyber risk regime); Brendan Heath, Note, Before the
Breach: The Role of Cyber Insurance in Incentivizing Data Security, 86 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1115, 1137–39 (2018) (discussing governmental regulatory options around
standard setting and information dissemination); Nehal Patel, Note, Cyber And
TRIA: Expanding the Definition of An “Act of Terrorism” to Include Cyber Attacks,
19 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 23 (2021) (proposing amendments to the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act so that the Act more clearly covers acts of cyberterrorism); Kyle D.
Logue & Adam B. Shniderman, The Case for Banning (and Mandating)
Ransomware Insurance, 28 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript 1)
(proposing a “limited ban on indemnity for ransomware payments with exceptions
for cases involving threats to life and limb, coupled with a mandate that
property/casualty insurers provide coverage for the other costs of ransomware
attacks.”).
6
Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Strengthening Cybersecurity with
Cyberinsurance Markets and Better Risk Assessment, 102 MINN. L. REV. 191, 273–
76 (2017).
7
Michael Faure & Bernold Nieuwesteeg, The Law and Economics of Cyber
Risk Pooling, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 923, 959 (2018).
8
Jan Martin Lemnitzer, Why Cybersecurity Insurance Should be Regulated and
Compulsory, 6 J. CYBER POL’Y 118, 125–26, 128–31 (2021).
9
Kenneth S. Abraham & Daniel Schwarcz, Courting Disaster: The
Underappreciated Risk of Cyber Insurance Catastrophe, 27 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 64–
66 (2021).
10
Daniel Woods & Andrew Simpson, Policy Measures and Cyber Insurance:
A Framework, 2 J. CYBER POL’Y 209, 221 tbl.2 (2017).
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Admittingly, I also contributed to this growing heap of cyber
insurance regulation scholarship. In my latest work, I relied on public policy
arguments to make the case for a set of governmental interventions in the
markets, particularly around the indemnification of: “(1) acts of cyber
terrorism or state-sponsored cyber operations; (2) extortion payments for
ransomware attacks; and (3) administrative fines for violations of statutory
data protection regulations.” 11
It is important to note that all of these proposals have yet to be
implemented in any meaningful way, including in North America,12 the
largest cyber insurance market in the world.13 While some changes have
certainly occurred around the margins, 14 for the most part, the status quo on
Asaf Lubin, Public Policy and the Insurability of Cyber Risk, 5 J.L. & TECH.
TEX. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1–2).
12
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 includes a
provision for Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study the U.S. cyber
insurance market. H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. 33 (2020) (enacted). In May 2021 GAO
produced a report summarizing many of these proposals and submitted them to the
appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of the Treasury for
consideration. To date, it does not appear that any substantive measures have been
taken to implement the report’s proposals. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-21-477, CYBER INSURANCE: INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS FACE
CHALLENGES IN AN EVOLVING MARKET (2021).
13
World Cyber Insurance Market to Reach $14 Billion by 2022: Report, BUS.
INS. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20161207/STORY/
912310861/World-cyber-insurance-market-to-reach-$14-billion-by-2022-Report
(“A report by U.S.-based market research firm Allied Market Research has said that
the global cyber insurance market is expected to grow at a compounded annual
growth rate of 28% between 2016 and 2022 to reach $14 billion by 2022 . . . . North
America is expected to hold the largest cyber insurance market share during the
forecast period, driven by enforcement of data protection regulations in the United
States, increases in levels of liability and legislative developments.”).
14
On the issue ransomware, the U.S. Treasury Department issued an advisory
at the end of 2020, which warns companies not to pay ransom to sanctioned entities.
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ADVISORY ON POTENTIAL SANCTIONS RISKS FOR
FACILITATING RANSOMWARE PAYMENTS (2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/
files/126/ofac_ransomware_advisory_10012020_1.pdf. In September 2021 the
Department issued an updated advisory that noted that the Office of Foreign Asset
Control (OFAC) when evaluating possible enforcement outcomes will consider “full
and ongoing cooperation with law enforcement both during and after a ransomware
attack — e.g., providing all relevant information such as technical details, ransom
payment demand, and ransom payment instructions as soon as possible — to be a
significant mitigating factor.” U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, UPDATED ADVISORY ON
11
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cyber insurance remains. Why have legislatures and regulators been so slow
to adopt any of these proposals? Perhaps, we have been looking at cyber
insurance regulation through the wrong lens.
So far, we have focused much of our collective theorizing on sui
generis interventions, tailored and designed to the specific risks of
cyberspace. 15 But cyber insurance is, after all, merely a sub-category within
a broader umbrella of insurance products, which are designated to transfer
risks from evolving technologies (from a products liability insurance for 3D
POTENTIAL SANCTIONS RISKS FOR FACILITATING RANSOMWARE PAYMENTS 5
(2021), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ofac_ransomware_advisory.pdf.
This includes the company’s “self-initiated and complete report of a ransomware
attack to law enforcement or other relevant U.S. government agencies . . . .” Id. The
updated advisory extends to companies involved “in facilitating ransomware
payments on behalf of victims” (thereby potentially extending the advisory to
insurers and other actors involved in the negotiation with the hackers on behalf of
victims). Id. at 4. Nonetheless, it should be noted that so far only limited enforcement
action has been taken by OFAC against the payment of ransom. See Michael T.
Borgia & Dsu-Wei Yuen, OFAC Makes Waves in Fight Against Ransomware, but
Practical Effects Unclear, DAVIES WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://www.dwt.com/blogs/financial-services-law-advisor/2021/10/ofac-updatedransomware-advisory (clarifying that at the end of 2021 OFAC issued its “first-ever
sanctioning of a cryptocurrency exchange for transacting with ransomware gangs”
but suggesting that “standing alone”, such limited OFAC action, while “significant”
by themselves, nonetheless generate “unclear” actual effects on deterrence.).
On the issue of developing cybersecurity standards, it should be noted that a few
states (namely, Utah, Indiana, and Ohio) have either adopted or are in the process of
adopting cybersecurity safe harbor rules. These rules provide covered entities with
immunity from liability in state courts for any cybersecurity or data breach, subject
that the company commits and complies with certain cybersecurity standards and
frameworks laid down in the law. See generally New Ohio Law Creates Safe Harbor
for Certain Breach-Related Claims, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: PRIV. & INFO. SEC.
L. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2018/11/05/newohio-law-creates-safe-harbor-certain-breach-related-claims/; Romaine Marshall,
Utah Considers a Cybersecurity Safe Harbor as Ransomware Runs Riot, JD SUPRA:
GLOB. PRIV. & SEC. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
utah-considers-a-cybersecurity-safe-96201/; Gretchen M. Rutz, John L. Landolfi,
Christopher L. Ingram, Christopher A. LaRocco & Sarah Spector Boudouris,
Indiana Attorney General to Create Safe Harbor for Businesses that Implement
Reasonable Cybersecurity Plans, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=da29facf-7ea3-4439-ba25-28b5479577b6.
15
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Vagle, Cybersecurity and Moral Hazard, 23 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 71, 85 (2020) (discussing the “sui generis principal-agent problem” of
cybersecurity).
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printed products16 to automobile insurance for autonomous vehicles 17).
Might we, therefore, be better served, when thinking about the utility of
regulating these markets, if we considered the larger network effects at the
intersection of torts, insurance law, technological evolution, and social
adoption?
It is undisputed that “evolving technologies generate novel questions
and that these questions sometimes give rise to thorny cases.” 18 What is more
fraught, however, is the idea, taken up by law-and-technology scholars, that
questions motivated by different technological changes and dynamics
nonetheless share some underlying similarities. 19 For the law-andtechnology folk, these questions arise for similar reasons and are answered
in similar ways, justifying the adoption of a single unified theory. 20 As Lyria
Moses argued: “[r]ecognizing the similarities between problems arising in
different technological contexts creates the possibility of learning from the
consequences of past legal responses to technological change.” 21
Unfortunately, legal analysis is the land of doctrinal segregation and
isolationism. “Lawyers tend to break along technological lines (health
lawyers, cyber-lawyers, etc.) or doctrinal lines (contract lawyers, tort
lawyers, etc.).”22 While legal specialization is certainly welcome—
especially where it aims to improve the quality of legal service and reasoning
while reducing the costs of conducting research and analysis23—at times it
is hindering and even blinding. After all, insurance lawyers whose business
model depends on the mitigation of losses from technological harm are not
16
See, e.g., Jordan Lipp & Steven Michalek, 3D Printing: Product Liability,
Professional Liability and Other Tort Aspects of the Burgeoning Industry, DEF.
COUNS. J., Apr. 2020, at 1, 6 (2020); TRAVELERS INDEM. CO., HAVE YOUR 3D
PRINTED CAKE AND EAT IT TOO 17 (2016), https://www.travelers.com/iwdocuments/business-insurance/tech-3D-whitepaper-BTCWH.0003-D.pdf.
17
Automated and Electric Vehicles Act, 2018, c. 18 (U.K.), https://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/18/contents (the act applies the existing insurance
infrastructure and requirements from traditional automobiles to autonomous
vehicles).
18
Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457, 469 (D. Md. 2015).
19
See Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological
Change?, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 589, 594 (2007).
20
See id.
21
Id. at 598.
22
Id. at 594.
23
See generally Clarke B. Rice, Comment, Legal Specialization: A Proposal
for More Accessible and Higher Quality Legal Services, 40 MONT. L. REV. 287, 288
(1979).
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dramatically dissimilar from their law-and-technology counterparts. Both
are fascinated by the same set of questions: if, when, and how, might private
and public regulation mitigate losses resulting from technological risk?
This short paper is an attempt to build a first-of-its-kind bridge
between these two scholarly silos. 24 Directed at an insurance audience, the
paper attempts to draw attention to a body of law-and-technology scholarship
that has so far gone mostly unnoticed by insurance professionals. The paper
is divided into three parts. Part I identifies the different phases in a
technology’s life cycle and discusses the challenges that each of these phases
introduces on the insurance market for risks resulting from technology’s
continuous evolution. Part II then moves to explore the law-and-technology
literature to distill key understandings about the effectiveness and utility of
governmental interventions in mitigating risks from emerging, evolving, and
disruptive technologies. This section identifies three primary lessons
learned, focusing on the intersections between technology and classification,
regulation, and globalization. Finally, Part III returns to the cyber insurance
debate to apply these lessons. In particular, the section looks to assess the
merits of the New York Insurance Regulator’s recent Cyber Insurance Risk
Framework 25 as the first ever state-wide cyber insurance regulation in the
United States. The paper discusses the promise and limits of this regulation
in the broader context of the insights from law-and-technology literature and
emerging trends in the cyber insurance market.

Ryan Calo, responding to a paper by Kenneth Abraham and Robert Rabin on
liability and insurance for autonomous vehicles, demonstrated the existence of these
scholarly silos. He noted, “[t]he puzzle of how to deal with the contingency of
technology and its social impacts is not limited to driverless cars, but endemic to law
and technology scholarship. Personally, I doubt Professors Abraham and Rabin—
each renowned scholars of civil liability—identify themselves as working in ‘law
and technology’ as such. I imagine that for the authors, the ascendance of automated
vehicles is just a fact about the world like any other, as the progress of technology
often is. In my experience, however, reasoning about technological change
sometimes requires special care.” Calo, supra note 1, at 87–88 (2019) (footnote
omitted).
25
Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, Superintendent, N.Y. State: Dep’t Fin. Servs.,
to All Authorized Prop./Cas. Insurers (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/
industry_guidance/circular_letters/cl2021_02.
24
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BETWEEN TORTS, INSURANCE, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
EVOLUTION

Technological changes are those involving “any tool or technique,
any product or process, any physical equipment or method of doing or
making, by which human capability is extended.”26 Such extensions can take
myriad forms. The invention of the first iPhone is different from the
invention of the iPhone 8. While both are technological changes extending
human capability, one is emerging and disruptive, while the other offers a
minor expansion within an already established line of innovation, causing far
limited ripple effects. 27
Illustration 1: Phases of an Industry Life Cycle28
Emergence

Market Size

Growth

/

Maturity

Emerging
solution ~

----,,
, ,

,,

High growth
Fragmentation, no
potential, limited or dominant player,
no regulation, no
shapeable
direct competition
regulation

Low growth, high
concentration,
stable regulation,
mature industry

No growth,
restricted
financing,
losses

Rivalry among
players

Low (high product
differentiation)

Increasing (weak
buyers, low entry
barriers)

Strong (stronger
buyers, higher
entry barriers)

Extreme (many
exits, price
competition)

Strategy focus

Innovation

Ability to grow

Market share ,
lower costs

Ramp down,
disengage

Indicators

DONALD A. SCHON, TECHNOLOGY AND CHANGE 1 (Dell Publ’g Co. 1967)
See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 298 (1985) (“New products and
processes, though never risk-free in themselves, usually prove to be less hazardous
than the older, manmade substitutes they replace.”).
28
SUN WU, STRATEGY FOR EXECUTIVES 21 (Strategy for Execs. ed., 2019 ed.
2019).
26
27
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As technology matures, our understanding of the risks associated
with its deployment and use changes. 29 This includes both first-party harms
(those harms that first adopters of the technology might incur directly from
using such an emerging technology) and third-party harms (the possible
liabilities for damages to others from the development and deployment of a
new technology). 30 The latter harms are perhaps even more fundamental as
the introduction of such liability could significantly stifle creativity and
innovation. 31 In thinking about technological risk, its evolution over time,
and its interplay with insurance as a mitigating tool, we may wish to rely on
a classic industry life-cycle model. At each stage of the model––from the
embryotic pre-emergence stage, to the emergence stage, to the growth stage,
to the maturity and ultimate decline stages––different kinds of insured risks
could be potentially introduced, and those may impact different categories
of policyholders along the supply chain in different ways: from developers,
to manufacturers, to distributors, to consumers.
Especially at the embryotic and emergent phases, where technology
is most unstable, challenges would arise in both torts and insurance around
the issue of liability. 32 Indeed, the law often treats developers and first
See The Evolution of Risk in the Face of Technology, ZURICH (Nov. 10, 2014),
https://www.zurich.com/en/knowledge/topics/global-risks/the-evolution-of-risk-inthe-face-of-technology (discussing how evolving technology generates “fresh
risks.”).
30
As applied in the context of cyber insurance specifically see Lubin, supra
note 11, at 6–7.
31
See, e.g., Fred Roeder, How Liability Lawsuits Drive Up Drug Prices, Stifle
Innovation, and Harm Patients, CONSUMER CHOICE CTR. (May 7, 2020),
https://consumerchoicecenter.org/how-liability-lawsuits-drive-up-drug-pricesstifle-innovation-and-harm-patients/; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM,
THE FUTURE OF AI LIABILITY IN THE EU: PROTECTING CONSUMERS WITHOUT
STIFLING INNOVATION 20 (2020) (discussing how changes to the existing liability
regime in AI regulation could stifle innovation).
32
See Dennis R. Connolly, Insurance: The Liability Messenger, in PRODUCT
LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT
131, 135 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones eds., 1994) (“[T]he more
scientifically advanced the product, the more uncertainty it is likely to engender in
insurers. Precisely because it is such a departure from other products, it has no track
record and thus provides no solid basis for predicting and pricing the risks
involved.”); Peter W. Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom: The Impact on
Innovation, in PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN
UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 138, 138 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones eds.,
1994) (“It is the new venture with the unfamiliar product that can least tolerate the
29
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adopters “as taking their chances with a technology,” 33 assigning all costs
for potential harms from creating and using the technology to them. 34 Courts
“greatly prefer natural, old, or established hazards to those deriving from
new technologies.”35 As such, their early rulings may set chilling effects on
continued development and use of the technology. 36 Insurers, in turn, will
either not offer the coverage or offer only limited protections with
significantly high premiums.37
Government interventions at this stage could focus on creating a
counterbalance to these inherent disincentives within the law on innovation,
research, and design of new technologies. This is because “[t]here is hardly
a product in use today––a car, plane, boiler, municipal water system, drug,
vaccine, or hypodermic syringe––that is not many times safer than its
counterpart of a generation or even a decade ago.” 38 So, to the extent that
“[i]nnovation and technological change . . . reduce risk,” 39 the government
would benefit from summoning the courage and implementing the incentive
structure so that developers and users may survive the turbulent embryotic
and emergent period. 40
extra measure of instability from the legal environment that does not provide
predictable results.”).
33
Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law
and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1260 (2012).
34
See Connolly, supra note 32, at 134 (noting the various ways state laws can
be “insurer-unfriendly”).
35
Huber, supra note 27, at 307.
36
Graham, supra note 33, at 1268–70.
37
Trevor O. Jones & Janet R. Hunziker, Overview and Perspectives, in
PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN
ENVIRONMENT 1, 2 (Janet R. Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones eds., 1994) (“Even though
product safety may have been improving, companies were experiencing more
product liability cases and the size of the awards was increasing. As a result, their
insurance costs were going up and for some products, insurance coverage was being
withdrawn altogether.”).
38
Huber, supra note 27, at 298.
39
Id. at 298–99.
40
For an alternative view, one that posits that technology does not evolve in a
linear way towards ultimate safety, see Vagle, supra note 15, at 92–94 (suggesting
that the “uniquely American concept of technology advancement,” as adopted by
Silicon Valley, is one of “innovation-over-maintenance.” According to this
approach, companies prefer the ability “to rapidly move from idea to prototype to
product” even if that comes at the expense of their customers’ security. “One of the
more significant problems with this approach is the increased risk associated with a
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A more nuanced view suggests that different technologies would
experience different embryotic stages, with tort and innovation interacting in
different ways. Some technologies will “produce ‘too many’ lawsuits” while
others might produce “too few.” 41 This is because legal uncertainty “can cut
two ways.”42
Uncertainty as to the prospect, viability, and magnitude of
tort claims regarding an invention may chill its development
and diffusion. But uncertainty as to matters such as the
existence of a cause of action and the likelihood of recovery
also may stifle the filing of claims that attack the innovation
as unreasonably dangerous. 43
The nature of the technology, the scope and magnitude of its likely
harms, and the volume of harmful occurrences that actually materialize,
would all play a role in the cost-benefit analysis behind prospective litigation
and liability insurance.
In any event, a common theme along the time continuum of the
technology life cycle is the notion that “uncertainty does give way to
knowledge over time. Society learns as it produces and assembles
information about technological hazards.” 44 With information comes a better
ability to regulate and set expectations of behavior and duties of care; with
that the risk becomes “fully assimilated within everyday tort law.” 45 Insurers
appreciate this level of stability, which translates in turn into lower premiums
and higher caps as risk modeling and management solidifies.
But law continues to interact with the technology even after it has
fully matured. Danielle Citron carefully described how law, as designed by
company’s inability (or unwillingness) to seriously consider the negative
consequences of their design decisions in the race to innovate.”).
41
See Graham, supra note 33, at 1269.
42
Id. at 1268.
43
Id. at 1268–69.
44
Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 141
(1995).
45
Graham, supra note 33, at 1242. If to use Baker’s terminology, once a
technology reaches a certain maturity then “tort doctrine and the consistent behavior
of insurance adjusters” will begin to converge. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as
Tort Regulation: Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12
CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 12 (2005). This is because “street level bureaucrats” will over time
begin to take over “the bulk of the tort law universe” to a point where tort law and
insurance practice engage in regular and mutually beneficial conversation. Id.
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courts, regulators, and legislatures, might interact with technology
throughout its life cycle:
First, it recognizes the new form of harm, but not the benefit
that the new technology has occasioned. This drives the law
to adapt existing theories of liability to reach that harm.
Second, after the technology’s benefits become apparent,
the law abruptly reverses course, seeing its earlier awards of
liability as threats to technological progress and granting
sweeping protection to the firms in the new industry.
Finally, once the technology becomes better established, the
law recognizes that not all liability awards threaten its
survival. It then separates activities that are indispensable to
the pursuit of the new industry from behavior that causes
unnecessary harm to third parties. 46
External actors, such as reinsurers, might need to step in at different
stages to offer an intervention. Think about developments in engineering
technologies in the United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. “[T]he scope of challenging engineering projects—from larger
and more complex manufacturing, infrastructure, and aircraft—were now
beyond the capacity and expertise of a single insurer. These risks required a
new level of expertise and risk management not readily available within the
ranks of US insurers.”47 Established European reinsurers, such as Swiss Re,
“extended their capacity to reinsure these single, large risks in collaboration
with insurers and large corporate clients.” 48 Reinsurance thus stepped in to
provide a safety net and a necessary degree of assurance for innovation to be
tested, proven, and ultimately assimilated.
Where insurance and reinsurance are not available, the government
might take a more active role. Consider the United States government
indemnification frameworks for commercial space-flight operators. The
operators are required to obtain “third-party liability insurance in the amount
of the maximum probable loss (MPL), according to a calculation performed

Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 115 (2009)
(footnotes omitted).
47
SWISS RE CORP. HIST., A HISTORY OF US INSURANCE 24 (2017),
https://www.swissre.com/dam/jcr:36ebe594-097d-4d4d-b3a7-2cbb8d856e85/150Y
_Markt_Broschuere_USA_EN_Inhalt.pdf.
48
Id.
46
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by the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration].”49 Where the third-party
liability claims exceed the MPL, “the government has in essence made a
statutory promise to pay for the next tier, or tranche, of up to $2.8 billion
dollars in any third-party liability claims faced by the space-flight entity.”50
Because the advancement of a vibrant commercial space industry is a matter
of national security importance to the United States and its economy, the
government is willing to step in and offer this promise. 51
II.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
LITERATURE

A complex set of questions goes into an entity’s decision to generate
new law in a technologically evolving environment. These questions include:
What do we mean by “new law”? Who is the “entity” that makes that
decision? And what forms might “law generation” take? Law-andtechnology scholars have been fascinated by these questions. Their ability to
answer these questions effectively is rooted in their willingness to approach
such questions not solely from a legal or economic perspective. Rather, many
of these scholars adopt an interdisciplinary lens that is socio-legal. For them,
regulation is not merely the “promulgation of an authoritative set of rules,
accompanied by mechanisms . . . for monitoring and promoting compliance
with these rules.” 52 They step outside of what Christel Koop and Martin
Lodge call the “prototype regulation,” the public interventions that are
“intentional and direct.”53 Instead, they adopt a far higher level of
abstraction, seeing regulation as a varied set of “mechanisms of social
control.” 54

Matthew Schaefer, The Need for Federal Preemption and International
Negotiations Regarding Liability Caps and Waivers of Liability in the U.S.
Commercial Space Industry, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 223, 230 (2015).
50
Id. at 231.
51
Id. at 233–34. Note that the government may intervene in other ways. The
government can promote international standards on liability through diplomacy. Id.
at 242–44. The government can also legislate immunity from liability under certain
circumstances. See, e.g., id. at 254 tbl.1 (discussing legislation on immunity for
space activities in Virginia, Colorado, Texas, New Mexico, California, and Florida).
52
A READER ON REGULATION 3 (Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott, & Christopher
Hood eds., 1998).
53
Christel Koop & Martin Lodge, What is Regulation? An Interdisciplinary
Concept Analysis, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 95, 105 (2017).
54
A READER ON REGULATION, supra note 52, at 4.
49
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The section below offers a non-exhaustive summary of four of the
key insights that scholars in this area have promulgated around technological
regulation. It includes the intersection between technology and
classification, technology and the regulator, and technology and
globalization. When we think about insurance regulation, specifically the
regulation of insurance for evolving technologies, we might benefit from
exploring these insights.
A.

TECHNOLOGY AND CLASSIFICATION

New technologies “may take earlier regulations by surprise.”55
These technologies introduce new risks and reduce old ones; they trigger
new activities, and thereby fall into “regulatory lacunae” or “present
regulatory misfits.”56 Underlying all of these is the sense that “emerging
technologies challenge existing regulatory paradigms.”57 Indeed, both judgemade common law and statutory regulation depend on categorizations that
evolve over time. In this regard, rule-appliers might be tempted to fit square
pegs into round holes. Law-and-technology scholars highlight the fact that
any such legal categorization is a mere “construct” where “the dispute and
context are the immutable reality.”58 As such, “[i]f legal categories do not fit
a new reality well, then it is the legal categories that must be re-evaluated.” 59
Insurance law has its own set of traditional classifications. Insurers
often rely on “classification criteria” in the “marketing, underwriting, and
pricing” stage. 60 These are a set of “factors insurance companies use to
assign individual applicants to groups differing in riskiness for the purpose

Anupam Chander, Future-Proofing Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 15 (2017).
Id.
57
Id. at 16. See also Gregory N. Mandel, Legal Evolution in Response to
Technological Change, in LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 225, 227 (Roger
Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, & Karen Yeung eds., 2017) (noting three lessons that
are “generalizable cross a wide variety of technologies, legal fields, and contexts.
These three lessons are: (1) pre-existing legal categories may no longer apply to new
law and technology disputes; (2) legal decision makers should be mindful to avoid
letting the marvels of new technology distort their legal analysis; and (3) the type of
legal disputes that will arise from new technology are often unforeseeable.” (citation
omitted)).
58
Mandel, supra note 57, at 234.
59
Id.
60
Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PENN. L.
REV. 517, 517 (1983).
55
56
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of determining whether insurance will be sold to them, and, if so, at what
cost and on what terms.”61
New technological risks might result in breaking away from
paradigmatic insurance classifications. Take for example the size of a
company. Oftentimes, size is a useful category for determining the nature
and scope of a risk posed by a prospective client. But in the cyber insurance
domain, small companies could pose significant risk for cyber incidents (e.g.,
a business model that centers around the collection and transfer of large
volumes of personally identifiable information), 62 whereas a large company
might pose a minimum risk. 63
When addressing new technological risks, insurers frequently use
technology as well. The use of insurtech and lawtech tools open the door for
predictive analysis and the ability to mine vast data troves to provide insights
into the actuarial process. 64 Insurers and reinsurers alike “can better clean
and process their data and identify indicators for known and unknown

61

Id.
See Eric Chabrow, Cyber-Insurance: One Size Doesn’t Fit All, SEC. AGENDA,
Mar. 2013, at 14, 15, https://fa94d5c47256403c613d-7164cafcaac68bfd3318486ab2
57f999.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com//security-agenda-re-assessing-risk-evolving-threatsrequire-new-approach-to-risk-management-pdf-h-41.pdf (Citing Kevin Kalinich,
global network and cyber-risk practice leader for Aon Risk Solutions, an insurance
brokerage, who said that “[t]o the extent that an entity has a large number of
personally identifiable information records, then there’s a much bigger chance of
exposure.”).
63
Cf. OECD REPORT, supra note 5, at 74 (“Insurance companies also focus
significant attention on the company's security practices and policies, depending on
company size and amount of coverage being sought. For smaller
companies/coverage amounts, the underwriting process will focus on basic cyber
security practices such as use of a firewall, anti-virus/malware software and data
encryption, as well as frequency of data backups and use of intrusion detection
tools.”)
64
See Agnieszka McPeak, Disruptive Technology and the Ethical Lawyer, 50
U. TOL. L. REV. 457, 461–68 (2019) (discussing lawtech). See, e.g., Gina Clarke,
How Your Insurance Quote Is Powered by Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (Jan. 21,
2019, 6:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ginaclarke/2019/01/21/how-yourinsurance-quote-is-powered-by-artificial-intelligence; How Strong Is the Impact of
Artificial Intelligence in the Insurance Industry?, MEDIUM: INMEDIATE.IO (Aug. 1,
2019),
https://inmediatesg.medium.com/how-strong-is-the-impact-of-artificialintelligence-in-the-insurance-industry-34bd93ad47ac.
62
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risks.”65 Indeed, machine learning “can recognize patterns that human
underwriters never thought to investigate, or those that correlate with risk so
subtly that they were not previously identified.”66 Insurers may also integrate
technology throughout their business by encouraging clients to wear
connected devices and place advanced sensors in their vehicles or on their
networks. 67 Such “trove of personal data and corresponding analytics” may
be used to “limit major risks before they occur,” 68 personalize insurance
offerings, 69 engage in continuous underwriting, 70 and detect insurance fraud
more easily. 71
At the same time, however, “[t]he iterative, unsupervised analysis
used by AI to price insurance policies may undermine the limited state and
federal protections that exist to protect vulnerable groups and suspect classes
from higher prices.” 72 This adds to a growing list of potential inequalities
that could emerge from an overutilization of technology for insurance
marketing purposes, including: algorithmic bias, data harvesting, privacy
intrusions, insurance data breaches, and ultimately discrimination.73 Anya
Prince and Daniel Schwarcz have, for example, demonstrated how the use of
Jennifer Coleman, Risk Management Implications and Applications of
Artificial Intelligence Within the (Re)Insurance industry, in THE IMPACT OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE (RE)INSURANCE SECTOR 19 (SCOR SE ed.,
2018), https://www.scor.com/en/download/file/25130?token=def50200e8f41bdba
1037e4db3993f17964956470fd96275cfcbc2b7217828b4cba870aa6bc069b54009f4
4ccf32ee1e13328782e368382e06b2b64cc7fdeb1a566931b95cbcd7177e5dbbf09fc
5d7bd8d8860761dbe1e7eb83a4eddf4017ce3ef74840f1e3f67e4dc1cd03727ef1d14
6f3474a76fa310f66b755c9589b2e40f8ed80ddea9.
66
Samuel Lewis, Insurtech: An Industry Ripe for Disruption, 1 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 491, 494 (2017).
67
Id. at 494–95. See also Yehonatan Shiman, Expected Bad Moral Luck, 25
CONN. INS. L.J. 112, 149 (2018) (noting that insurtech based “underwriting
procedures rely on information gathered through mass-data collections from smartphones, web searches, wearable sensors, and meta-data, among others to make
better-informed decisions about an applicant’s risk level. Access to this
information’s quantity and quality better positions insurance companies to assess
risk, set representations and warranties, as well as mitigate exposure to moral hazard
and fraud.” (footnotes omitted)).
68
Lewis, supra note 66, at 494.
69
Id. at 495–96.
70
Id. at 496–97.
71
Id. at 497.
72
Rick Swedloff, The New Regulatory Imperative for Insurance, 61 B.C. L.
REV. 2031, 2058 (2020).
73
See generally id. at 2057–70.
65
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AI by insurance would inevitably result in “proxy discrimination” which
could prove an “increasingly fundamental challenge to anti-discrimination
regimes.” 74 In other words, the use of these technologies by insurance
agencies could by itself introduce new regulatory challenges and complicate
existing legal classifications.
B.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE REGULATOR

Rebecca Crootof and B.J. Ard introduce a methodological
framework for rule-appliers and rule-prescribers in structuring their
responses to what they call “TechLaw” questions. 75 The framework may be
summarized in the following three-pronged analysis.
First, the assessor is called to “[i]dentify the type(s) of legal
uncertainty at issue with regard to an artifact [new technology], [techenabled] actor, or activity [tech-enabled conduct].” 76 In this phase, the
assessor will explore three questions: (a) “[w]hether and how existing law
applies” (and what legal gaps and overlaps might have been erected); (b)
“[w]hether existing law accomplishes its intended aims” (and in what ways
might it be under or over inclusive); and (c) “[w]hether existing legal
institutions have the authority, competence, or legitimacy to resolve
applications and normative uncertainties.” 77
Second, the assessor is asked to “[e]valuate [the technology’s]
potential benefits and risks” and “consider who is likely to be impacted and
their ability to mobilize for change.” 78 Based on this information, the
assessor might adopt a permissive approach (a “[p]resumption favoring less
regulation” where the “tech’s opponents bear [the] burden of changing law”)
or a precautionary approach (a “[p]resumption favoring preemptive
regulation” where the “tech’s proponents bear [the] burden of changing
law). 79
At the final stage, the assessor “determine[s] which response(s) will
best resolve the [tech-fostered] legal uncertainty.” 80 The assessor may
Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of
Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1264 (2020).
75
Rebecca Crootof & BJ Ard, Structuring TechLaw, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
347, 350 fig.1 (2021) (providing an illustration of their methodological framework).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
74
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choose to “[e]xtend [e]xtant [l]aw,” “[c]reate [n]ew [l]aw,” or “[r]eassess the
[r]egime.” 81
This analytical roadmap is extremely useful, even from the
perspective of a regulator looking to regulate a new insurance market for
technological risk. It provides a useful canvas and set of factors that each
assessor may look at to evaluate at different junctures throughout the life
cycle of the technology and as disputes arise. Nonetheless, the framework
stops short of providing immediate answers to three follow-up questions:
who, when, and what.
1. Who?
Who should be the assessor? Local, state, or federal legislatures and
courts? State insurance regulators and attorney generals, or federal
administrative and enforcement agencies? Or what about international
organizations and foreign governments? What is clear to me is that the
regulation of technological risk and the insurance markets associated with it
requires a reconceptualization of the old McCarran–Ferguson dichotomy.
The 1945 Act, passed by the 79th Congress, sought to exempt the business
of insurance from most federal regulation. 82 But to think of insurance
regulation in such a narrow way is unpersuasive.
The assessor or regulator can be different entities, at different times,
depending on the situation. Whoever is the assessor must be mindful of their
institutional capacities and pitfalls. They should be cautiously aware of the
limits of their authority and the long-term consequences that a poorly made
decision could have on the continued evolution of the market.
Consider, for example, the management of insurance policy
language. Legislatures and regulators are far superior to courts in this area.
The legislative and regulatory processes allow prospective
implementation of changes to policy language and
prospective calculation of premiums based on risks assumed
by the insurer. Modifications to agreements through the
judicial process, however, are primarily retrospective, long

81
82

Id.
McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945).
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after the contracts were entered into and premiums
calculated and paid based on agreed-to policy language. 83
Moreover, many insurance policies, in an attempt to future-proof
their language, incorporate into their text the evolving regulation by the
legislator. For example, directors and officers liability policies often include
an exclusion for:
[A]ny actual or alleged violation of any securities law,
regulation or legislation, . . . any other federal securities law
or legislation, or any other similar law or legislation of any
state, province or other jurisdiction, or any amendment to
the above laws, or any violation of any order, ruling or
regulation issued pursuant to the above laws . . . . 84
In this regard, any regulator needs to understand that by amending
or extending laws, they are directly injecting themselves into the bilateral
contracts between insurers and insureds, who take their cues directly from
the legislation. Since “legal liability for [c]yber [r]isk is rapidly and
constantly evolving,” 85 in part through state legislation and enforcement
agency action, cyber insurance is particularly susceptible to this
phenomenon.
But state regulation also has its limits. As Daniel Schwarcz and
Steven Schwarcz have shown, “[s]tate insurance regulation is poorly
equipped to address systemic risk in insurance . . . .” 86 This is due, in part, to
the fact that “[d]elegating to States sole regulatory responsibilities over
Prodigy Commc'ns Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 288 S.W.3d
374, 387 (Tex. 2009) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
84
BEAZLEY, INFORMATION SECURITY & PRIVACY INSURANCE WITH
ELECTRONIC MEDIA LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM F00106SL 7 (Aug. 2011 ed.,
2011),
https://www.beazley.com/documents/Private%20Enterprise/Wordings/
NEW%202011%20Info%20Sec%20Form%20F00106SL%20082011%20ed.pdf.
85
Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A Comprehensive Analysis
of the Evolving Exposure, Today's Litigation, and Tomorrow's Challenges, 33
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 369, 406 (2015)
86
Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1627 (2014). The second reason for why states
tend to underperform when regulating systemic risk (beyond the “internalization
principle”) is the fact that state regulators “lack the necessary expertise and
perspective.” Id. at 1631. State insurance regulators are also lacking in their ability
to coordinate together and with the federal government. Id. at 1632.
83
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activities that produce negative externalities nationally or internationally will
generally lead to underregulation of those activities.” 87 Since certain cyber
risks are systemic, due to common vulnerabilities and concentrated
dependencies that could lead to cascading effects, 88 states cannot possibly
regulate cyber insurance alone.
But it is not just states. National governments cannot be the sole
insurance regulators of technological risk. Neil Doherty once wrote that the
“long delays between the writing of the [insurance] contract and the
realization of loss permit a substantial cumulative change in the information
base” on which the policy was formulated and priced. 89 Doherty noted that
“[t]hese changes arise both from legislative and judicial changes in liability
rules and from judicial precedents which re-interpret insurance contract
wordings.”90 As technology is not always limited by territorial line drawing,
the legislative and judicial changes might occur overseas and have ripple
effects at home. Examples of such international changes include: an
international treaty on cyber attribution; new cybersecurity best practices
from the International Standard Organization (“ISO”); changes to privacy
policies promulgated by a European national data protection authority; or
revised understanding of common cyber insurance clauses developed by the
International Underwriting Association or Lloyd’s Market Association.91
Moreover, the changes in the “information base” that Doherty spoke
of, which impact the risk environment, can also be non-legislative and nonId. at 1628.
DAVIS HAKE, ANDREAS KUEHN, ABAGAIL LAWSON & BRUCE MCCONNELL,
CYBER INSURANCE AND SYSTEMIC MARKET RISK 5 (2019), https://www.eastwest.
ngo/sites/default/files/ideas-files/cyber-insurance-and-systemic-market-risk.pdf.
See also Abraham & Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 11 (discussing “damage risk,”
“liability risk,” and “coverage risk,” as three prerequisites for a cyber catastrophe
that could result in correlated losses for insurers).
89
Neil A. Doherty, The Design of Insurance Contracts When Liability Rules are
Unstable, 58 J. RISK & INS. 227, 243 (1991).
90
Id. at 243–44.
91
One example of this can be seen in the context of extraterritorial data
protection legislation, such as the European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). See Commission Directive 16/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU). See also ANU
BRADFORD, THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE WORLD
142 (2020) (introducing a “Brussels Effect” as an example for utilizing European
market power to force foreign corporations to comply with European data protection
standards. Bradford cites to others who have described the GDPR as “unashamedly
global.” She notes that given both the fact that the regulation is “extraterritorial and
highly inelastic” and the fact that abandoning the EU market “is not even remotely
a commercially viable option” results in the EU’s expansive regulatory capacity.).
87
88
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judicial. They may be societal. As society discovers new technology and
employs it in ways not first imagined or envisioned by its creators, the
technology takes on a life of its own. What it means to be safe or negligent,
efficient or inefficient, tortious or innocent, will evolve over time. They will
be shaped by social customs and intuitions formed around the technology. 92
This may be a slow and incremental process, or, depending on the
technology, could also rapidly move alongside technology’s deployment and
adoption. If private law and private ordering “draw from and reinforce social
norms,”93 as Merill has suggested, then a broader set of actors could be seen
as potential norm-developers, and therefore possible regulators of this
liability and insurance environment. From design decisions made by
technology companies to influencers on TikTok, our collective understating
of custom around new technologies will be shaped by an ecosystem larger
than one state insurance regulator.
2. When?
A complex set of questions goes into deciding when to introduce a
new law into a technologically evolving environment. 94 Sometimes, simply
letting the market run its course can prove to be the more efficient route.
Consider this historical example:
In ancient China mandarins who ran espionage operations
devised what they believed was a foolproof secret
João Marinotti notes that even in the context of emerging and disruptive
technologies, shared “social customs and intuitions can stem from cognitive effects
of human perception, as well as from learned associations, whether economic, social,
or otherwise.” João Marinotti, Tangibility as Technology, 37 GA. STATE U. L. REV.
671, 709 (2021) (footnotes omitted).
93
Thomas W. Merrill, Private and Public Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE NEW PRIVATE LAW 575, 578 (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B.
Kelly, Emily Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2021). See also Nathan B. Oman,
Private Law and Local Custom, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW PRIVATE
LAW 159, 172–74 (Andrew S. Gold, John C.P. Goldberg, Daniel B. Kelly, Emily
Sherwin & Henry E. Smith eds., 2021) (referring to the “prevailing beliefs and
practices of the community” as a source for of private law rules, further noting that
courts “fit the law to the character of their particular community, with an eye to its
institutions and historical development.”).
94
Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible
Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 203–05 (2001) (outlining questions
for policymakers crafting international regulations for new technologies).
92
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communication system for spies. They shaved a spy’s head,
wrote a secret message on the bald skull, then waited until
the spy’s hair grew back, at which point he would be sent on
his way. At his destination his head would be shaved again,
revealing the message. 95
If we were rule-prescribers living at that time and were worried
about espionage, we might rush into setting some rules of the road for the
emerging practice of “skull messaging.”
Instead, we could also wait. As Jonathan Zittrain observed, “[t]he
procrastination principle rests on the assumption that most problems . . . can
be solved later or by others.”96 Indeed, in our historical example, the obvious
was soon realized––that the months of delay required before a new set of
hair grew, made the communication itself quite futile. 97
It was this deficiency in the system that made the Greeks in 480 BCE
devise the scytale as an alternative. 98 The scytale “involved writing on the
length of a sheet of papyrus wound around a staff, which, when removed and
sent on, was intelligible only to a recipient who had a twin staff of precisely
the same diameter and length.”99 Of course, the scytale was only useful for
short messages. The need to write longer secret communications is what
eventually led to the discovery of invisible ink. 100
Round and round we go as needs trigger innovation and user
feedback triggers new needs, which in turn trigger new innovations. Ruleprescribers must choose wisely the right moment for a regulatory
intervention in this otherwise closed loop. At the same time, they might
benefit from not waiting too long. Early interventions could provide “a more
ERNEST VOLKMAN, THE HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE: THE CLANDESTINE WORLD
OF SURVEILLANCE, SPYING AND INTELLIGENCE, FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE POST9/11 WORLD 20 (2007).
96
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET – AND HOW TO STOP IT
95

31 (2008). See also Yoram Dinstein, The Recent Evolution of the International Law
of Armed Conflict: Confusions, Constraints, and Challenges, 51 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 701, 710 (2018) (suggesting that in the context of the introduction
of AI to the battlefield and the “awesome conundrums” that such a weapon system
introduces, “answers should lie in wait until we have a much better picture of what
the technology will actually look like.”).
97
VOLKMAN, supra note 95, at 20 (“[I]t takes time for a full head of human hair
to grow back, meaning any intelligence on that skull cannot be very timely.”).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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objective regulatory atmosphere, before parties become entrenched and
adversarial. In contrast, deferring action (usually in the name of preserving
discretion and gathering information), often leads to incremental decision
making, which is more susceptible to interest group influence.” 101
This tension has perfectly manifested itself in the intellectual
exchange between Ryan Calo, Kenneth Abraham, and Robert Rabin with
regards to autonomous vehicle liability and insurance regulation. On one side
stands Calo, who claims that no one holds a “crystal ball” and that the “very
prospect that dramatically distinct modalities of transportation could arise
from the ability of vehicles to drive themselves seems to caution against a
preemptive, administratively intense solution that forbids state legislatures
or courts from experimentation.”102 On the other side stand Abraham and
Rabin. As autonomous vehicles “are already on the roads being tested,” they
posit that “[w]e cannot afford to wait and see what the future brings over a
period of decades . . . .”103 The future, they say, “is just over the horizon. The
failure to do something about that is not the equivalent of keeping our
policymaking powder dry.”104
Timing is everything in life and in law. As the book of Ecclesiastes
teaches “[t]o every [thing there is] a season, and a time to every purpose . . .
.” 105 Therefore, different kinds of regulations by different kinds of regulators
will be appropriate at different times. It is therefore possible that Calo,
Abraham, and Rabin are all correct in thinking that some regulations may be
good for now, while others might be good for later.
3. What?
In the age of technological innovation, rulemaking can take different
forms. “Many agencies regularly employ a mix of policymaking tools on a
given issue—sometimes promulgating or amending a rule, sometimes
bringing an enforcement action, and sometimes issuing a guidance
document.” 106 To increase opportunities for trial-and-error, innovation, and
flexibility, regulations can be further experimented with. One type of forum
Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
175, 204 (2014).
102
Calo, supra note 1, at 87.
103
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for this kind of legal incubation is the “regulatory sandboxes”– environments
in which regulation can be pre-tested in a relative vacuum with real
stakeholders. 107 In such a scenario, co-regulation becomes possible as
collaboration is fostered between the regulator and the regulated entity. 108 In
the context of cyber insurance, Israel is now attempting to become a national
sandbox, a beta site for experimentation in cyber insurance regulation. 109
Regulation does not only mean formal prescriptive top-to-bottom
ordinances. Formal legal rules are but one of four types of constraints that
“regulate” in the broader sense. Lawrence Lessig identified the three other
constraints as, “social norms, the market, and architecture.” 110 I have already
elaborated on the importance of social customs and intuitions in private law
and private ordering, 111 so I will briefly address the two remaining
constraints.
Price points, supply-and-demand, and barriers to accessibility will
impact behavior. Combined with other soft law instruments, such as “private
standards, codes of conduct, certification programs, principles, guidelines,
and voluntary programs,” 112 these form market constraints on the
technology, which in turn shape our expectations around its functions,
properties, and limits.
Choices in the design and architecture of a technology will also
impact our collective understanding of its features and capacities. As noted
by Paul Ohm and Blake Reid, “[w]e used to regulate things, and now we
regulate code.” 113 João Marinotti has shown, for example, how the

107

(2019).

Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 579

For further reading on regulatory sandboxes see id.; Radostina Parenti,
Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs for FinTech Impact on Innovation,
Financial Stability and Supervisory Convergence, Study for the Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs, POL’Y DEP’T. ECON. SCI. & QUALITY LIFE POL’Y,
PE 652.752, 33–38 (Sept. 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
STUD/2020/652752/IPOL_STU(2020)652752_EN.pdf.
109
See Asaf Lubin, Cyber Insurance as Cyber Diplomacy, in CYBER WAR &
CYBER PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DIGITAL CONFLICT IN THE CRADLE OF
CIVILIZATION 22, 27–30 (Michael Sexton & Eliza Campbell eds., 2020).
110
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 123 (2006).
111
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
112
Gary E. Marchant, Governance of Emerging Technologies as a Wicked
Problem, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1861, 1866 (2020).
113
Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has
Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1702 (2016).
108

2021

INSURING EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY

155

“cryptographic imperatives” 114 of exclusion and control, which are
embedded in the core of Bitcoin, resulted in the “establishment of a shared
social custom and intuition about how bitcoins are used and what nonowners may or may not do.” 115 In other words, the architecture of the
technology helps regulate the legal interests and liabilities that emerge from
and in response to a volatile technological space.
All of these demonstrate that when we wish to engage in the
regulation of an evolving technology, say around its liability and insurance,
we must adopt a broader lens. There can be different regulated entities. For
example, we may think about the regulation of insurers, or of the insured; we
may regulate tech providers, or their clients; we may limit our regulation to
public entities, or extend it to private entities; we may focus on large
corporations or particular sectors; or we may adopt a whole-market
approach, including small-to-medium enterprises.
Applying these concepts in the cyber insurance context, we may be
able to develop a non-exhaustive list of potential examples of both direct and
indirect regulations that may be employed by different kinds of regulators at
different times. What distinguishes these two categories is that whereas
direct regulations target the commercial insurers themselves, indirect
regulations target the legal and policy environment in which these insurers
operate.
Illustration 2: Examples of Different Initiatives for Direct and Indirect
Cyber Insurance Regulation
Direct Regulation
Cyber Claims InformationSharing Requirements
Security Data Depositories
Mandatory Policy Language or
Questionnaires
Governmental Insurance of Last
Resort for State-Sponsored Cyber
Operations and Other Acts of
Cyber War or Terrorism
114
115

Marinotti, supra note 92, at 726.
Id. at 728.

Indirect Regulation
Data Breach Notification Laws
State/Federal/Foreign Privacy and
Data Protection Regulation
Subsidies for Cybersecurity
Services and/or Research and
Development
Cybersecurity Liability Safe
Harbor Laws
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Direct Regulation
Prohibition on Ransomware
Payments
Prohibition on Indemnification of
Statutory Data Protection Fines
Standard Metrics, Requirements,
and Other Data Formats for
Assessment or Claims Process
Establish Insurer Liability for
Providing Security Advice
Make Cyber Insurance
Compulsory for Certain Industries
C.
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Indirect Regulation
Liability for Tech Providers (e.g.,
Internet-of-Things Vendors)
Government Exercise of its
Procurement Power to Support
Cybersecurity Best Practices
National Certification of
Cybersecurity Standards and
Licensing of Cybersecurity
Providers
International Frameworks for
Cybersecurity Attribution
Rules of International Law on
Responsible Behavior in
Cyberspace

TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBALIZATION

Technology, in the sense of human innovation and human progress,
is a phenomenon that defies national borders. Technology has a tendency to
spread and connect individuals in ways that go beyond jurisdictional lines.
“A regulator sitting in Washington, D.C. considering how to approach a new
technology must keep in mind that her counterpart in Brussels, Beijing, or
Bogota is likely pondering the same question. She has to make decisions to
regulate or not, or how to regulate, while looking over her shoulder.” 116
This lesson is particularly acute in the context of cyber insurance.
This is because cybersecurity and cyber stability are matters of national and
international security, and therefore are matters that are intimately connected
to global political affairs. Espionage operations by a foreign nation state, like
the SolarWinds hack, could have cascading effects on the markets. 117 As
such, what is discussed in the United Nations Security Council in the
morning may end up on the table of a commercial insurer in Connecticut by
evening time. Few other insurable risks share this property. Put differently,
if the Ace American Insurance Company is truly concerned with whether its
wartime exclusion applies in the case of an alleged Russian ransomware
Chander, supra note 55, at 21.
For more on the SolarWinds Hack see Asaf Lubin, SolarWinds as a
Constitutive Moment: A New Agenda for the International Law of Intelligence, JUST
SEC. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/73989/solarwinds-as-aconstitutive-moment-a-new-agenda-for-the-international-law-of-intelligence/.
116
117

2021

INSURING EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY

157

attack, 118 it should focus its advocacy not only in the courts of New Jersey
but also at conferences in Geneva.
As I have written elsewhere, cyber insurance should be seen as a
form of cyber diplomacy, as we aim to promote globally coordinated,
nuanced, and effective regulation.
If cyber diplomacy is truly concerned with enhancing cyber
deterrence and promoting norms that ensure global cyber
stability and cyber peace, it must broaden its perspective to
include international insurance norms for modeling and
indemnifying the perils of cyberspace.
....
In an effort to expand the multi-stakeholder
understanding of the risks cyber threats pose to society, we
must begin to draw additional actors into the fold. Involving
commercial reinsurers and insurers, brokers, underwriters,
cyber risk insurance pool directors, corporate chief cyber
risk officers, and insurance law and policy scholars and
think-tanks in a larger conversation about the future of
international cybersecurity would be a pivotal first step
toward a more democratic and inclusive dialogue. Such a
dialogue would offer more nuanced solutions to practical
challenges, and would ensure better norm design by the very
actors that will ultimately be tasked with ensuring the
norms’ proper implementation. 119
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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN FOSTERING CYBER
INSURANCE

With all this knowledge we may now come back to the question
posed by the organizers of A Cyber Cyber Insurance Conference: what can,
and should, state and federal governments do to promote more robust cyber
insurance markets? To focus our analysis, let us look at one possible
regulation: the recent New York Cyber Insurance Framework, the first of its
kind in the country. The following section will assess the promise and limits
of this framework and then offer broader observations about the future of
cyber insurance regulation.
A.

THE NEW YORK CYBER INSURANCE FRAMEWORK

On February 4, 2021, the New York Department of Financial
Services (“NY DFS”), led by Superintendent Linda Lacewell, introduced the
first state-wide cyber insurance regulation in the United States. 120 The
circular, titled Cyber Insurance Risk Framework, 121 begins with a bombastic
statement. Weaving together the impacts of COVID-19 on remote working,
the rise of ransomware attacks, and the recent SolarWinds cyber-espionage
campaign, it makes the case for such a state-wide intervention. The circular
is thus meant to “foster the growth of a robust cyber insurance market that
maintains the financial stability of insurers and protects insureds.”122
The circular is the result of an “ongoing dialogue with the insurance
industry and experts on cyber insurance,” including meetings with “insurance
regulators across the U.S. and Europe.”123 It identifies “systemic risk” and
“silent risk” (what is known as non-affirmative cyber coverage) as two of the
biggest challenges for managing cyber insurance, alongside the general
challenge of dealing with the growing threat of cybercrime, in particular in
the form of ransomware attacks. 124
The framework applies only to “authorized property/casualty
insurers [licensed in New York] that write cyber insurance.” 125 The
framework centers around seven practices that are to be employed by the
Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, supra note 25.
Id.
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insurers to “sustainably and effectively manage their cyber insurance risk.”126
The circular does note that each insurer’s risk portfolio will vary on the basis
of their “size, resources, geographic distribution, market share, and industries
insured.” 127 As such, the framework seems to offer a general and flexible
model, subject to specific interpretation by each insurer. On the one hand,
such flexibility allows for the kind of experimentation in regulation that I
have argued is positive as the insured risks continue to evolve. On the other
hand, such open-ended regulation could also result in a difficultly to enforce
the standards, which could lower the regulation’s overall effectiveness. The
seven practices insurers should employ are:
(1) “Establish a Formal Cyber Insurance Risk Strategy;”
(2) “Manage and Eliminate Exposure to Silent Cyber
Insurance Risk;”
(3) “Evaluate Systemic Risk;”
(4) “Rigorously Measure Insured Risk;”
(5) “Educate Insureds and Insurance Producers;”
(6) “Obtain Cybersecurity Expertise;” and
(7) “Require Notice to Law Enforcement”. 128
There is obviously a lot of good intention here. The NY DFS should
be commended for taking such a bold initiative at a time where few
government regulators and legislatures (be it local, state, or federal) seem
keen to enter the fray. It also targets some really low-hanging fruit, by
formalizing the need of insurers to establish a cyber insurance risk strategy,
retain qualified personnel, and obtain cybersecurity expertise, including
through the use of outside providers and vendors. As one commentator noted,
these are “both obvious and eye opening.” 129 If there were any cyber insurers
who were still unaware of these basic requirements, the circular might serve
as a much-needed wakeup call and could help “create new incentives and preincident programs.”130 To the very least the circular helps codify a certain set
of industry practices and general standards, which by itself is an important
contribution, one that could be mimicked by other state regulators.
126
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Nonetheless, the circular suffers from significant ambiguity and
uncertainty, further demonstrating the limits of one state regulator’s authority
and power in tackling such a massive undertaking. Within the limits of this
paper, I will demonstrate four core challenges with the current framework.
First, why focus only on “authorized property/casualty insurers that
write cyber insurance?” 131 In so doing, the circular seems to neglect both
those insurers who do not explicitly write cyber insurance, as well as other
insurers outside the property/casualty world. All these insurers might still be
engulfed by the challenges of silent cyber coverage, yet the policy seems to
target a very limited group. 132 As I have demonstrated above, asking who
should be regulated, and in what ways, is one of the first challenges for every
assessor.
Second, the framework “can inspire competing reactions as it signals
incoming mandates that hover on the horizon without offering much
substance as to how to accomplish them.”133 Take, as one example, the issue
of “systemic risk.” The circular calls on insurers to assess this risk, even
citing the specific concern of supply-chain attacks as a possible vector in this
regard. 134 But the circular falls short of actually providing insurers with
specific tools, resources, or even general frameworks to conduct such
analysis. As we have already seen, systemic risk is one of the areas where
state insurers are way over their heads. Similarly, requiring insurers to
develop “qualitative and quantitative goals for risk”135 as part of a cyber
insurance risk strategy and calling on them to “obtain cybersecurity
expertise” 136 does not mean much if the state is not also willing to assist those
insurers who need it by providing actual resources, actuarial techniques,
specific recommended security controls, and even subsidies to certain
industries or public entities, to accomplish these efforts. 137
Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, supra note 25.
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Third, the circular’s only specific requirement—that policyholders
notify law enforcement for ransomware attacks 138—is also a source of some
confusion. As a general matter, this is a policy that I have advocated for and
makes a great deal of sense.
[L]aw enforcement cannot carry out their duties, if they are
not being informed of the hacks in the first place. There is a
growing trend in cyber insurance policies to allow for
ransomware extortion payment indemnification without
requiring the policy holder to first notify the police or the
FBI of the ransom prior to seeking compensation. Insurers
argue that making such a demand to policyholders would
disincentivize them from acquiring the policy in the first
place, as they are worried about potential reputational
harms. This collective action problem is resulting in a race
to the bottom where it is enough for one insurer to avoid a
requirement of notifying the FBI, for all insurers to follow
suit out of worry of losing business. 139
Nonetheless, one state regulator cannot tackle a collective action
problem like this alone. The race to the bottom will continue if outside the
state of New York, a failure to notify will continue to be the norm. This is a
matter better left to federal regulation, not state. The circular is also silent as
to the entity to be notified or scope of notification. 140 The reality is that the
state is unable to actually enforce disclosure to federal law enforcement,
over which it has no authority, nor can it be certain that the notification will
be picked up and effectively handled once transmitted. A notification policy
is only as good as the enforcement action that flows from it. As for local
and state law enforcement, they are certainly in no position to manage the
threat of global cybercrime and cyberwarfare, thereby highlighting the
futility of notifying them.
Finally, a fourth challenge with the circular concerns the obligation
to “rigorously measure insured risk” by focusing on a “data-driven” plan
and “third-party sources.” 141 In so doing, NY DFS seems to be going all-in
Letter from Linda A. Lacewell, supra note 25.
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on an AI-driven big-data insurtech solution. But the regulator fails to
provide an actual list of preferred technologies, service-providers, or
vendors. It leaves to the insurers the decision of who to contract with and in
what ways, without even providing them the most limited set of
considerations. Not all insurtech products are created equal, and different
solutions could be more or less effective. Furthermore, as discussed, “the
accelerating evolution of AI and big data render proxy discrimination a
fundamental threat to important goals of many, if not most,
antidiscrimination regimes.” 142 The state fails to even acknowledge the
myriad of ways by which the use of these tools could result in inequality,
bias, privacy intrusion, and prohibited discrimination.
B.

THE FUTURE OF CYBER INSURANCE REGULATION

For cyber insurance regulation, we must think outside the box. We
need to adopt agility in the way we conceptualize the very concept of
regulation. Understanding that the regulator, the regulated, and the
regulation, can take different forms and occur at different times, is pivotal in
developing a comprehensive and collaborative response to the contemporary
threats and perils of cyberspace.
While insurance is traditionally viewed as a state-regulated market,
the subject matter being insured, “cybersecurity,” is certainly not. Insurers
and insurance regulators should adopt a more holistic understanding of
protections in cyberspace, recognizing that it is a domain ripe for complex
public-private partnerships across a range of environments and
frameworks. 143 Lessons from decades of U.S. regulation of privacy and data
protection through a patchwork of sectoral and state initiatives (as opposed
to an omnibus model in Europe) have led many scholars to call for federal
and centralized regulation. 144
Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 74, at 1300.
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The same could be applied here, precisely because of the unique
features of cybersecurity as an evolving threat and the information
asymmetries that accompany it. As such, no one state can handle
cybersecurity risk on its own, just like no one insurer can cover this risk,
especially if a mega cyber catastrophe occurs. In fact, recent trends have
demonstrated precisely how unlikely it is that states and the market could
handle this on their own. In the face of “skyrocketing” cyberattacks,
including ransomware, insurers have begun to increase prices for cyber
insurance products and denying coverage unless stringent controls are put in
place. 145 As a result of that the market for primary cyber insurance “is really
drying up.” 146 In the face of these market shifts, only the federal government
can effectively respond to and help fill this growing cyber insurance gap. An
effective cyber insurance regulation will thus harness the commitment and
dedication of state officials in a broader campaign co-led by national
governments and the private sector.
CONCLUSION
As Rudyard Kipling masterfully opined in his 1943 poem, The
Secret of Machines, the touch of technology can on occasion “alter all
created things.”147 Emerging and evolving technologies introduce unique
risks, harms, and regulatory challenges at different phases throughout each
technology’s life cycle. Against this background, rule-prescribers and ruleappliers have both a regulatory toolkit and a set of discretionary choices to
make about the timing, scope, and nature of both prospective and reactive
regulation. Commercial insurers play an important role in this narrative, both
as private regulators of the technology they insure, and as a lobbying force
to government in the formation of new regulations.
This paper has tried to demonstrate that there is value in exploring
insurance regulation for emerging technologies through the broader lens of
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the law-and-technology literature. Law-and-technology scholars, who have
mastered a comparative regulatory history of different technologies, in
different locations, and at different times, might be able to teach us a thing
or two about the way we should govern our technological insurance markets.
The reverse is, of course, also true. Law-and-technology scholars,
by and large, focus much of their writing on the theory and practice of torts,
contracts, property, criminal, constitutional, and administrative law. Rarely
though, do these tech-minded academics engage in a deep dive into
insurance. If we each step outside of our own silo and explore what the folks
on the other side are writing and thinking about, we might be able to develop
deeper and more nuanced insights.

